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REBALANCING SECTION 512 TO PROTECT FAIR
USERS FROM HERDS OF MICE-TRAMPLING
ELEPHANTS, OR A LITTLE DUE PROCESS IS NOT
SUCH A DANGEROUS THING
Malla Pollackt
ABSTRACT
I agree with the basic concept of 17 U.S.C. § 512; to protect
Internet functionality, ISPs should have robust safe harbors against
liability for their subscribers' copyright infringement. However, the
current details of the notice and take down system are both unfair to
the general public and unnecessary to the economic health of the
United States. I suggest a robust, statutorily established digital fair
use right backed by a notice and take down procedure protecting fair
users. At a minimum, use of a purchased music file on any of the
purchaser's equipment should be fair use. Preferably, all personal
non-commercial use should be legal. Use or provision of technology
to enable fair use should not violate Chapter 12 of Title 17.
Additionally, ISPs should not be allowed (let alone incentivized) to
cut off subscribers as repeat, online copyright infringers absent court
decision on the alleged infringements.
t Professor of Law, American Justice School of Law; visiting Univ. of Idaho, College of Law,
through Spring 2006.
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A LONG INTRODUCTION
I have no quarrel with the basic concept of Section 512 of the
Copyright Act, holding ISPs harmless for their subscribers' copyright
infringement provided that the ISPs cooperate in notice-and-take-
down and subscriber-information subpoena processes-the Internet is
too valuable to be held hostage by the copyright industries. However,
I want such ISP protection to be tied to protections for the ISPs'
subscribers. Before I discuss the details of my suggestions, some
background is appropriate.
My approach to third party liability for copyright infringement is
driven by my approach to law, politics, and society in general. In my
non-humble opinion, money can and will take care of itself.
Government is necessary to take care of people. Yes, the Internet has
major commercial applications, but its most important functions are
not commercial. The Internet could be used to empower ordinary
people to take part in culture, government, and social networking. 1
These possibilities should not be stifled in the name of protecting
commerce.
Regarding the international situation, I am somewhat skeptical
that the interests of Americans in general are harmed by the so-called
global "piracy" epidemic. 2 First, I have seen no documentation that
the profits from foreign sales of American-authored works end up
primarily in the pockets of Americans or the coffers of the United
States treasury. Instead, the reports routinely lump "exports" and
"foreign sales" together, presumably to hide the amount of
outsourcing involved.3 Stronger intellectual property protection in
1. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (explaining how the Internet allows individual volunteers to produce
major cultural projects). The geographic spread of Japanese animation, and the increased
economic value of that art form, was fueled by massive copyright infringement by fans. See
Sean Leonard, Celebrating Two Decades of Unlawful Progress, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189,
225 (2005).
2. Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing on the Induce Act, S.
2560 Before Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter Induce Act
Hearings], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1276 (last visited Feb. 8,
2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Rep. Utah) ("Research now suggests that these piracy rings -
which call themselves filesharing networks - will create between 12 and 24 billion infringing
copies this year alone. This unprecedented level of piracy fundamentally threatens America's
world-leading music, movie, and software industries and the future of legitimate Internet
commerce.").
3. See Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter May 2005 Hearings],
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfmid=1514 (statement of Stephen M. Pinkos,
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low-wage foreign nations, furthermore, makes outsourcing more
attractive. Why should United States citizens be forced to pay higher
prices to copyright holders to protect profits that do not help United
States' citizens or their government? Second, I believe that much of
this alleged "piracy" is a foreseeable result of forcing strong
intellectual property protection on developing nations against their
best interests.4 Third, just as copyright infringement is not "piracy"
except in rhetoric, not making even more money is not "losing
money." Fourth, "piracy" figures are notorious for erroneously
claiming full retail price for goods that would never have been bought
at such prices. 5 If someone has ten dollars of disposable income to
Deputy Under Sec. of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Deputy Dir. of U.S. PTO,
conflating foreign sales and exports in reliance on STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INT'L. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2004 REPORT
(2004)); Counterfeiting and Theft of Tangible Intellectual Property: Challenges and Solutions:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Jon W.
Dudas, Acting Under See. of Commerce for Intellectual Property and acting Dir. of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, conflating foreign sales and exports), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=l119&witid=3193 (last visited Jan. 23,
2006); Malla Pollack, Right to Know?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 94-96 (1998)
(discussing Congress' reliance while considering DMCA on STEPHEN E. SIWEK & GALE
MOSTELLER, INT'L. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: THE 1998 REPORT (1998) which discusses "foreign sales" as if they are exports from
the United States). The United States lost 2.7 million manufacturing jobs between July 2000
and April 2004. See Pirates of the 21st Century: The Curse of the Black Market, Hearings
before the Sen. Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia, of the Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Sen. Voinovich, Rep. Ohio). Eliding exports and foreign
sales puts on intellectual property infringement the burden that properly belongs on so-called
"American" businesses' choice to outsource work, destroying American jobs to cut costs. See
generally ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (First Vintage Books ed. 1992) (1991)
(arguing that large firms no longer support their "native" countries' interests). In fact, one of the
main supports of counterfeiting in China is the investment by American businesses in China,
seemingly through creation of production facilities in China. See Pirates of the 21st Century:
The Curse of the Black Market, Hearings before the Sen. Subcomm. on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, of the Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 22-23 (2004) (statement of
Daniel Chow, Law Professor, Ohio State Univ.).
4. See Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About Indigenism, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 815, 824 (2003) ("IP is a major source of indigenous poverty. Surely, TRIPS is the
biggest disaster faced by the Third World since the end of the territorial-based colonial era.").
5.
Last week, the Business Software Alliance released a study that attached a dollar
figure to losses from 'piracy.' This week, the research director of the company
that conducted the study admitted that the figure announced to the press assumed
that every unauthorized copy was a lost sale, whereas in reality perhaps one in
ten actually represented such a loss.
Induce Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 7 (remarks of Gary J. Shapiro, Consumer Elec. Assn.).
P2P studies are similarly flawed.
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buy music, ten dollars is all the person will spend on music.
Assuming the ten dollars was used to buy ten "bootleg" tapes and that
authorized tapes cost ten dollars each, the authorized distributor has
not lost one hundred dollars in sales. Yet this is exactly the illogic
routinely used when the so-called copyright industries complain about
"piracy." In short, international commercial considerations should
not be used as an excuse to burden the population of the United States
with greater copyright-levies. 6
As to Americans who have allegedly infringed copyright by
disseminating copyright-protected works online, I believe that the
content industries are reaping the foreseeable result of their long delay
in providing networked customers with the type of products they want
- unbundled, inexpensive, rapidly downloadable materials. This is
especially true in the field of music. Most people are honest7- even
college students.8  Barnes and Noble profitably sold its paper
6. Over half the revenues of the "American" copyright industries are from "foreign sales
or exports." See May 2005 Hearings, supra note 3, at I (remarks of Eric Smith, President, Int'l
I.P. Alliance).
7. Empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that a large segment of the population
values fairness. See Ernst Feht, Alexander Klein, & Claus M. Schmidt, Contracts, Fairness and
Incentives, 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies and Ifo Inst. For Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1215,
2004), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract-549224 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) ("[T]here is
considerable evidence indicating that a substantial percentage of people also care about
fairness"; citing multiple empirical studies). Therefore, contracts which rely on fairness produce
better results for the contract offeror than those which rely solely on the offeree's desire to
maximize his or her own economic reward. See id (concluding that "concerns for fairness
strongly affect the incentive properties of the contracts"); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch &
Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S299 (1986)
(reporting "the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves.").
8. Government action supporting the copyright industries' efforts to demonize P2P and
college students is bothersome. For example, one report bundled discussion of criminal
investigation of copyright infringement rings with a report on RIAA's success in getting
universities to reduce students' access to P2P on campus. Nothing in the report justified tying
the for-profit criminals to either students or P2P. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-
04-504, FILE SHARING: SELECTED UNIVERSITIES REPORT TAKING ACTION TO REDUCE
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-
503 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). See also Building on "Pornography, Technology, and Process:
Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-Peer Networks, " Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=902
[hereinafter Pornography Hearings] (hearing containing one panel on child pornography and
abuse with another on P2P, even though the GAO report "released on March 13, 2003 indicates
that, while reports on P2Ps have increased, ultimately only 1 percent of the tips from the public
received by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children since 1998 involved P2P
technology.") (testimony of John Malcolm, U.S. Dept. of Justice). The FTC held a two day
Public Workshop on "Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Technology: Consumer Protection and
Competition Issues," on Dec. 15 & 16, 2004, which attempted to tie P2P to various problems.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING TECH.: CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ISSUES, available at
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SparkNote series of study guides for years while simultaneously
allowing free Internet download of the same content.9 Music is not
different.' 0  If music had been readily available as Internet
downloadable, reasonably priced, individual songs in the 1990s, the
United States would have escaped widespread contempt for copyright
law, widespread hatred of the recording industry, and most of the so-
called P2P11 piracy epidemic. 12 Even the former founder of Napster
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/filesharing/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) [hereinafter
FTC Workshop].
9. See Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Post-Grokster Hearing], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1624 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) (statement of Sam
Yagen, former Barnes and Noble publisher).
10. Online music store magnatunes.com allows surfers to listen to all of several hundred
albums without charge. If the customer wants to download an album by MP3, the customer is
asked to pick a price with a minimum of five dollars and a suggested price of eight dollars. The
average price chosen by the buyers is slightly over eight dollars. See Magnatune,
http://www.magnatune.com; see also Tobias Regner & Ravier A. Barria, Magnatune: Variable
Pricing for Music 14-20 (March 2005), (unpublished comment, on file with authors), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=721596 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (giving
data on purchases at magngatunes.com). Sixty-three percent of the analyzed magnatune sales are
by United States customers. See id at 17. "Jambands [such as the Grateful Dead] allow their
fans to record live shows and to copy and distribute the recordings freely. Jambands have
enjoyed great commercial success in distributing music via the Internet in forms that other bands
have not dared to try. They have explicitly attributed their success to the bond of trust that they
have with their fans." Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll 2 (September 2005)
(unpublished comment, on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=805945 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
11. The term "P2P," or "peer to peer," refers to the use of computers to share information,
such as digital music, over the network without using a centralized server.
12. "Total music sales and profit of firm is higher, and total piracy (demand on the file
sharing network) is lower, when the firm sells a downloadable version." Jeevan Jaisingh, Piracy
on File Sharing Networks: Strategies for Recording Companies (July 22, 2004) (unpublished
comment, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-567681 (last visited Feb. 8,
2005) (recommending no use of digital rights management technology). "The proliferation of
legitimate [digital] music distributors in the marketplace has helped stem the tide of piracy."
"One of the major impediments to achieving a more level playing field.., is the bewildering
array of competing technologies." Digital Music Interoperability and Availability: Hearing
before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Interoperability Hearings] (statement of
Howard L. Berman, Rep. Cal.). Only "last year," in 2004, "the recording industry finally
accepted the inevitability of digital distribution of music. They sold more singles last year than
any time in the previous 20 years, and consumers saved a great deal of money." Id. at 6
(statement of Mark Cooper, Dir. Research, Consumer Fed. Am.); "Five years ago, we said the
only way to compete with Napster, an unlicensed Napster, was with a legal Napster .... Id. at
19 (statement of Michael Barcy, Future of Music Coalition); "B[usiness] S[oftware] A[lliance]
believes that the most effective way to address the harm done by operators of illicit file sharing
networks is through the marketplace. Consumers will embrace appealing legal alternatives that
offer a rich and varied array of content." Induce Act Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of
Robert Holleyman, BSA at 2); "Any comprehensive solution [to copyright piracy] must
552 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 22
now realizes that early P2P use "wasn't about free. It was about
having every song or symphony or speech you ever heard, no matter
how exotic or obscure, at your fingertips."'1 3 Furthermore, many
activities that the content industry terms infringement should be
legally recognized as protected fair use. Finally, Section 512 only
incentivizes good behavior by ISPs who are vulnerable to United
States law; many downloads inside the United States are from servers
physically located abroad. 14 In short, the major protections demanded
by United States copyright industries are neither deserved nor
effective.
involve.., a reasonably priced, convenient, and portable distribution system that makes it as
possible to download music legally as can be done today illegally." Id. (testimony of Kevin
McGuiness, NetCoaltion at 7). Accord PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIVE PROJECT, ARTISTS,
MUSICIANS AND THE INTERNET 43 (2004),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPArtists.MusiciansReport.pdf [hereinafter Pew Study]
("Just over half of these down loaders (54%) say that they don't currently pay to download any
type of media files right now, but they would if the price, quality, and choice they wanted were
available."). Legal downloading services only became available in most Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") markets in 2004. See OECD,
DIRECTORATE FOR SCI., TECH. & INDUS., COMM. FOR INFO., COMPUTER AND COMMC'N
POLICY, WORKING PARTY ON THE INFO. ECON., REPORT NO. DSTIfICCP/IE(2004)12/FINAL 9
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l3/2/34995041.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter OECD 2005 Rpt.]. The movie industry has been even more resistant, only providing
robust online options in 2005. See Saul Hansell, Forget the Bootleg, Just Download the Movie
Legally, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at Cl ("After years of avoiding it, Hollywood studios are
preparing to let people download and buy electronic copies of movies over the Internet .... ).
In September 2005, Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters reaffirmed her belief that "the
majority of consumers who have engaged in illegal peer-to-peer "file-sharing" of music would
choose to use a legal service if it could offer a comparable product, and more fundamentally, if
they knew which services were legal." See Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (remarks of
Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyrights, at 4). She warned, however, that legal services would
remain at risk from illegal competition as long as numerous rights-holders battled for control;
therefore, she advised Congress to expand and simplify statutory licenses. See id at 5.
13. Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (remarks of Ali Aydar, at 1). Post-Grokster,
both legal and shadow P2P are growing. However, only about one in five desired music files
are available through licensed download services. See Issues Related to MGM v. Grokster:
Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Commerce July 2005 Hearing] (remarks of Adam M. Eisgrau, Exec. Dir., P2P
United, at 7), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id= 1594&witid=3971 (last visited Jan. 22,
2006).
14. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 UNIV. OF
COLORADO L. REV. 653, 677-79 (2005) (discussing location of P2P firms outside United States
jurisdiction). "Seven of the top ten major P2P software companies have chosen to locate outside
the U.S." Post-Groskter Hearing, supra note 9 (remarks of Sam Yagan, developer of eDonkey,
at 2). Having received a post-Grokster cease and desist letter from the RIAA, eDonkey is
converting to a closed format rather than pay the cost of legal-self defense; it expects all open
P2P to flee U.S. jurisdiction. See id at 7. But see Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9
(remarks of Mary Beth Peters at 3-4) (pointing out that courts in Australia, Taiwan, and Korea
ruled against P2P businesses shortly after Grokster decision).
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This preliminary discussion is relevant to the topic of this paper
because it undercuts the bunker mentality of the content industry, an
attitude which leads to the demonizing of any content use not totally
controlled by copyright holders and to fear of allowing standard
procedural safeguards to alleged online infringers. None of this,
however, means that I condone domestic competition by selling
copyright protected content without paying copyright royalties. Such
disputes, however, are disputes among various elephants and mice.
This paper stands up for people.
Mice and elephants are common online denizens originally
classified by Professor Peter Swire. 15 Elephants are large powerful
creatures, such as Disney, Verizon, the Motion Picture Association of
American (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA). Elephants have the respectful attention of
legislatures; mice do not. Therefore, elephants are usually successful
in obtaining statutes banning mouse-activities. But laws against mice
are difficult to enforce; mice flee, hide, and reproduce at great speed.
Driven crazy by repeated mouse-bites, elephants look for indirect
regulatory approaches, the most common being making some other
elephant responsible for the mice's depredations. 16 Hence, copyright
holders' desire to make ISPs liable for their subscribers'
infringements.
The online world, however, is not populated solely by mice and
elephants. The overwhelming supermajority of the 'Net's inhabitants
are merely people. Unlike elephants, people rarely get the attention
of Congress or government agencies-except in their role as potential
customers for elephants.17 Unlike mice, people cannot run and hide.
People are tied down by jobs, families, dentist appointments, and
mortgaged houses. Nor do people have elephantine resources for
coping with legal threats. Lawyers' letters generally come from
elephants. If the recipient is another elephant, the opposing elephants
trumpet and posture at each other until they either settle or sue. If the
recipient is a mouse, the mouse scurries to another mouse-hole. If the
15. See Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and
the Internet, 32 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 991 (1998) [hereinafter Swire, Elephants I ]; see
also Peter P. Swire, Elephants and Mice Revisited: Law and Choice of Law on the Internet, 153
UNIV. PENN. L. REv. 1975, 1978-80 (2005) (continuing metaphor).
16. See Swire, Elephants I, supra note 15, at 993, 1023-24.
17. "That content consumers have not had a strong influence on the shape of copyright
law is well-documented." Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L REV. 679, 747 (2003).
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recipient is a person, the person generally surrenders without a fight
and begs the elephant for mercy. 18
My concern with Section 512 is that numerous people (not
rodents) are being trampled by enraged elephants. The specific subset
of people who concern me are those making fair use of digitalized
works. My suggested cure has two prongs: first, statutory recognition
of a strong digital fair use right; second, modifications to the notice
and take down provisions of Section 512 ("NTP") to protect these fair
uses. Perhaps such changes could be enacted if the copyright
industries were mollified by subpoenas for the identity of P2P users. 19
Two terminological clarifications: this article uses "take down"
for any activity by the ISP which cuts off access to the allegedly
infringing material, including disabling links or location tools.
"Subscriber" is a broad term including any ISP patron.
Section one of this paper will briefly explain the history of NTP.
Section two will outline the current status of NTP. Section three will
discuss digital fair use. Section four will suggest a due process
modification of Section 512's NTP. While I believe the subpoena
process of Section 512(h) could also benefit from better procedural
protections, I will leave that topic for others.
18. See Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer
Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Sen.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. 49-51
(2003) [hereinafter Privacy Hearings] (statement of Lorrain Sullivan, a college student sued by
the RIAA). As of Sept. 21, 2005, "the RIAA has sued some 10,000 Americans, mostly
teenagers, their parents, and grandparents, and ruined some families financially." Post-Grokster
Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Gary Shapiro, at 9). "With an average settlement of $3000
per lawsuit, the RIAA has made some $30 million on this venture." Id at 9 n.14. According to
other sources, RIAA filed over 14,000 lawsuits against individual P2P "infringers" between
Sept. 2003 and Sept. 2005. See Recording Industry Sues More US File-Swappers, Reuters
(Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.freepress.net/news/print.phpid=11208 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2006). But see Nick Farrell, RIAA Sued by Victim, THE INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2005
(reporting that "Tanya Anderson, a 41-year old disabled single mother living in Oregon, has
countersued the RIAA for, inter alia, electronic trespass, abuse of process, and RICO
violations), available at http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=26641 (last visited Feb. 8, 2005);
Jon Newton, The "We're Not Taking Any More " Club (reporting on three individuals, including
Anderson, who have stood up to RIAA), available at http://p2pnet.net/story/6283 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2006).
19. See In re Charter Communications, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771,
772 (8th Cir. 2005) (ruling that 512 subpoenas are not available under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), i.e.,
for the identity of subscribers who exchange allegedly infringing content via P2P). See also
RIAA v. Verizon Internet Svcs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re Subpoena to Univ.
of N.C., 367 F. Supp. 2d 945 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
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SECTION ONE: THE ELEPHANT FIGHT LEADING TO NTP
The copyright industries in the United States are a large herd of
very rich elephants with long-standing paranoid tendencies.
Underlying the paranoia is the deep-seated belief that artists (or
intermediaries who distribute artistic works) have a natural right to all
social benefits even remotely connected to their works.20 On this,
Noah Webster agrees with Jack Valenti. 21 I disagree, as does the
United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.22 Copyright elephants' paranoia includes a myopic
fear of technical change: player-pianos, copy machines, video home
recorders, and now networked computers. 23
The onset of the digital age, however, brought to Congress'
attention a new set of extremely charismatic elephants - the maze of
20. This claim is often based on eliding the difference between "property" and so-called
"intellectual property." However, the owners of actual "property" do not, and should not,
receive the full social value of their "property." See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046-51 (2005) (explaining why "no property
owner is entitled to capture the full social value of their property.").
21. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 118 (Penguin Books 2004) (2003) (explaining
that Jack Valenti's assertion that "creative property" involves the same rights as physical
property is an industry attempt "to restore the tradition that the British overturned in 1710.");
Letter from Noah Webster to Senator Daniel Webster (Sept. 30, 1826), reprinted in NOAH
WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS (Burt
Franklin ed. 1968) (1843) (requesting perpetual protection for his writings). But see DAVID
MICKELTHWAIT, NOAH WEBSTER AND THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY 2, 10-11, 82-83 (2000)
(asserting that Webster inconsistently wanted extreme protection for books he issued even
though he borrowed heavily from earlier works).
22. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Svc. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' [U.S. Const.] Art. I, § 8, cl. 8."); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. The sole interest of the United States and
the primary object in conferring the monopoly.., lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors .... When technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Unfortunately, this pro-public domain dicta has not led to
pro-public domain decisions. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2001) (holding
constitutional the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act allowing Congress to extend
copyright terms of existing works despite claims of persons dependent on the public domain).
23. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158
(9th Cir. 2003) (mentioning content industry's hatred of new technologies including player
piano), rev'd on other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); MARK N. COOPER, TIME FOR THE
RECORDING INDUSTRY TO FACE THE MUSIC: THE POLITICAL SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS
OF PEER-TO-PEER COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 23-25 (Stanford Law School Center for
Internet and Society March 2005) (discussing numerous piracy panics), available at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edufblogs/cooper/archives/BENEFITSofPEERtoPEER.pdf (last visited
Feb. 8, 2006).
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telecommunication, equipment, and service businesses that enable
global computer interconnection. For simplicity, I will dub this herd
"network" and the copyright industry herd "content." Of course, not
all content and network business entities are supersized, but the
relatively small ones share many areas of common interest with the
gigantic herd guardians.
The two elephant herds have a love-hate relationship. Obviously,
they are interdependent. Digital commerce needs both network and
content. Unfortunately, in the 1990s both wanted (as is usual with
elephants) the elephant's share. Network wanted no liability for
anything- defamation, taxes, consumer discontent, and copyright
infringement. Network won on defamation 24 and has done quite well,
so far, on both taxes25 and consumer discontent. 26 NTP is part of the
congressionally brokered compromise on copyright infringement. 27
NTP is related to P2P technology because content elephants claim
24. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000), Communications Decency Act of 1996, which "creates a
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service." Zeran v. America OnLine, Inc,
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Section 230 immunity is
"broad" and survives "specific editing or [a] selection process." Carafano v. Metrosplash.Com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). See generally Jonathan Band & Matthew Schrers,
Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 300 (2002) (providing
overview of cases, concluding "federal and state courts alike have applied Section 230 liberally
and without qualification" to protect ISPs).
25. "No State or political subdivision thereof may impose any of the following taxes
during the period.. . ending November 1, 2007: (1) Taxes on Internet access. (2) Multiple or
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce." The Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub.
L. 108-435, § 2, 118 Stat. 2615 (2004).
26. AOL's posted "Terms of Current Use" (TUC) and related "Agreement to Rules of
User Conduct" (ARUC) make clear that AOL has the right, but not the responsibility, to delete
any content AOL deems objectionable. See AOL.com Agreement to Rules of User Conduct,
http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (last paragraph). A suit is
currently pending against AOL for allegedly over blocking email into the USA from foreign
countries. See Verizon Blocked Email Class Action Home Page,
http://www.kohnswift.com/verizon.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). AOL also retains the right to
terminate a subscriber without notice for any reason. See AOL.com Terms of Use,
http://about.aol.com/aolnetwork/aolcom-terms (last visited Feb. 3, 2006). The only case I was
able to locate which enforced access to an ISP is an unpublished opinion which enforced a
provision bargained for by an email business with its ISP to allow thirty days notice before
disconnecting service. The court made clear that the customers' business use of the service was
determinative. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Information Svcs., No. 97-593 1,
1997 WL 634384 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997).
27. See Cassandra Imfeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the
Legislative Development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Online Service Provider
Provision, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 291, 311 (2005) (crediting heavy lobbying of content industry
during 1988 for insertion of strong take down and subpoena power into statute providing limits
on ISPs copyright liability).
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that P2P renders the Section 512 compromise insufficient to protect
their interests. This claim, of course, is highly contested. Automated
search functions can find files traded via P2P and P2P networks can
be disrupted. 28
Returning to history, the National Information Infrastructure
Copyright Act of 199529 was drafted solely to effectuate the WIPO
Copyright Treaty's anti-circumvention and digital rights management
information provisions. 3 0 This proposed legislation raised the fear
level of network elephants because it did not address the open legal
question of how vicarious and contributory copyright infringement
doctrines would translate into the age of interconnected computing.
In response, Congressman Goodlatte led discussions between the two
herds (with some involvement of other parties) during the 10 4 th and
1 0 5th congressional sessions. 3 1  The first compromise with enough
support to be introduced as a bill was H.R. 2180, the On-Line
Liability Limitation Act, introduced by Mr. Coble on July 17, 1997.32
H.R. 2180 was a very different model than finally adopted. The
bill neither distinguished between direct and indirect copyright
liability nor discussed technological details of network operation.
H.R. 2180's core provision was a list of six broadly worded
conditions that, if satisfied, rendered the network elephant not liable
for its subscribers' copyright infringements. 33 The most controversial
28. See BAYTSP CORP., COMBATING ONLINE SOFTWARE PIRACY IN AN ERA OF PEER-TO-
PEER FILE SHARING 5-7 (2004), http://www.baytsp.com/downloads/WhitePaperFinal.pdf (last
visited Feb. 8, 2006) (advertising service to track and send take down notices effective against
files sent by P2P technologies and listing other techniques used against P2P networks); BayTSP
Corporation, Solutions FAQ (claiming usefulness of offered services against common P2P
technologies), http://www.baytsp.com/solutions faq.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). The
DMCA has spawned a "whole industry of copyright 'bounty hunters."' See Pornography
Hearings, supra note 8 (testimony of William Barr, V.P., Verizon Comm., at 6).
29. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995), introduced in the House by Rep. Moorehead on Sept.
29, 1995 and its companion bill S.1284, 104th Cong. (1995).
30. These treaty obligations are the triggers for 17 U.S.C. §§ 51201-1202 (2000).
31. See 144 Cong. Rec. H7095 (online ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, R-
Va.) (remarks leading to vote on Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
32. Earlier and later discussion drafts were not introduced for lack of broad support. See
Hearing on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281 Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. (1997), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/4001.htm (last visited June 15, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 1997
Hearings] (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks) (mentioning earlier drafts); 144 Cong. Rec E165 (online ed. Feb. 12,
1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, R-Va.) (remarks during introduction of H.R. 2281 and
mentioning later drafts ).
33. (a) EXEMPTIONS- A person shall not be liable-
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was the last, which could be met in either one of two ways. The first
option was the absence of some level of knowledge, raising the heated
issue of what type of knowledge should be sufficient for liability -
none, might know, should know, bright red flag, does know, or notice
from a content elephant. Content elephants argued that network
elephants wanted preferential treatment over other intermediaries
such as bookstores; content elephants insisted that only strict liability
would incentivize network elephants to take action against
infringers.34 Additionally, a network elephant also fulfilled the last
2180 provision for non-liability if the network entity was "prohibited
by law from accessing the material." This second option allowed the
service provider to escape liability by contractually binding itself not
to spy on its customers.35 The second option, of course, has not been
enacted. Instead, Congress abandoned the general approach of H.R.
2180.
While details and levels of complexity varied, all the later bills
were quite similar in format to the provisions eventually codified as
(1) for direct infringement, or vicariously liable for the infringing acts of another,
based solely on transmitting or otherwise providing access to material on-line, if
the person-
(A) does not initially place the material on-line;
(B) does not generate, select, or alter the content of the material;
(C) does not determine the recipients of the material;
(D) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to a particular
act of infringement;
(E) does not sponsor, endorse, or advertise the material; and
(F) (i) does not know, and is not aware by notice or other information
indicating, that the material is infringing, or
(ii) is prohibited by law from accessing the material; ....
H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
34. Compare Sept. 1997 Hearings, supra note 32, (statement of Roy Neel, U.S. Tele.
Assn.) (arguing that network should only be required to respond to notices sent by content), and
id. (statement of Tushar Patel, U.S. Web) ("[i]magine if a construction company were liable
because a car had an accident caused by the driver while driving on the road"; "I cannot exist
with a liability potential that I cannot control or minimize"), with id (statement of Lawrence
Kenswil, Universal Music Group) (arguing that network businesses "are seeking preferential
treatment over every other group that deals in copyrighted works every day"), and id (statement
of John Bettis, ASCAP) (arguing that under 2180 "there would be no inducement for the
infringing OSP to monitor the infringement, for its only liability would be an injunction, after
the fact."), and id (statement of Allee Willis, BMI) (arguing that "there should continue to be
no knowledge requirement for either direct or vicarious liability of service providers. Nothing
they do is so fundamentally different from traditional media as to warrant overturning the
bedrock strict liability principle of U.S. copyright law.").
35. See Sept. 1997 Hearings, supra note 32 (statement of Mike Kirk, Am. Intellectual
Property Law Assn.) (objecting to disjunctive second clause in paragraph F).
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17 U.S.C. § 512.36 Network elephants are not indirectly liable for
copyright infringement by their clients if the infringement is
committed via any of several separate, carefully defined technical
aspects of the network, 37 provided that the network entity (i)
expeditiously takes down allegedly infringing material (either on
receiving notice from a copyright holder or on seeing a bright red
flag), 38 (ii) does not interfere with content elephants' automated
attempts to find infringers or protect copyrighted works,39 (iii) refuses
service to repeat infringers, (iv) maintains an agent for responding to
take down notices; and (v) posts related information.40 While the
status of non-profit educational and library institutions varied greatly
between bills,41 the protections offered to persons whose postings
36. S. 46, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced Sept. 3, 1997 by Sen. Ashcroft); S. 2037, 105th
Cong. (1998) (introduced May 6, 1998 by Sen. Hatch), and Title II of the second through sixth
versions of H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998) (originally introduced by Mr. Coble on July 29, 1997
with no provision equivalent to current § 512). Limitations on network elephants' copyright
liability were enacted as Title 11 of Pub. L. 105- 304, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(effective Oct. 28, 1998). The only subsequent amendments were completely technical in
nature, merely correcting typographical errors in the original version. See Technical Corrections
to Title 17, Pub. L. 106-44, 113 Stat. 221 (1999) (effective Aug. 5, 1999).
37. "Transitory Digital Network Communications"; "System Caching"; "Information
Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users"; and "Information Location Tools." 17
U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000). The safe harbors for information posted by users and for
information location tools also require that the ISP not receive any "financial benefit directly
attributable to infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability
to control such activity." 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(B), 512(d)(1)(C)(2).
38. The scant case law on point requires the flag to be very bright red. See Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108-10 (W.D. Wa. 2004) (finding neither take down
notices nor selling of celebrity photographs sufficient); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI1, LLC, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
39. More specifically, the statute requires that an ISP "accommodates and does not
interfere with standard technological measures." 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). These are defined as:
technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works
and -
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and non discriminatory terms; and
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on
their systems or networks.
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). While leading ISPs, such as Verizon, offered to begin the standards
setting process in 1998 when NTP was enacted, as of Sept. 9, 2003, the copyright industry had
not been willing to even begin discussions. Pornography Hearings, supra note 8 (remarks of
William Barr, Verizon Commc'ns., at 1).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2005).
41. Compare S. 46, 105th Cong. (1997) (as introduced, Sept. 3, 1997) (including proposed
512(b)(3)(B) providing that take down notices are ineffective against a "person who is an
employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library or archive, acting within the
scope of his employment" if "that person reasonably believed (i) that the allegedly infringing
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were subject to take down notices changed very little. Take down
notices became slightly more content friendly, because ISPs were
required to take action based on certain defective notifications.42
Users obtained a slight additional protection; under the enacted
version, alleged infringers (not just service providers) can obtain
actual damages incurred from "[a]ny person who knowingly
materially misrepresents" that posted material is infringing.43
Apparently, this protection was motivated by the fear that one
copyright holder would seek to undermine competition from another,
not concern for mere people making fair use of copyrighted content.44
SECTION Two: CURRENT STATUS OF NTP
As intended, NTP is a privatized enforcement mechanism. 45
Copyright holders send to ISPs simple notices of alleged
infringement. ISPs are incentivized to immediately take down the
content without any investigation because such take down provides a
safe harbor from ISP liability to the copyright holder. ISPs have no
incentive to investigate or resist the notice because take down creates
use was a fair use" or "(ii) was otherwise lawful"), with H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998) (as
reported to House, July 22, 1998) (having no section dealing with non-profit educational or
library institutions), and id. (as passed by House, Aug. 4, 1998) (containing proposed 512(c)(2)
protecting nonprofit educational institutions from ISP liability for actions of any "faculty
member, administrative employee, student, or graduate student" unless such person is
"exercising managerial or operational responsibilities that directly relate to the institution's
function as a service provider"), and id. (as passed by Senate, Sept. 17, 1998) (inserting text of
S. 2037 which makes no separate provision for non-profit educational or library institutions but
includes Sec. 204 requiring a study of the issue), and id. (as enacted and codified) (containing
512(e) slightly limiting responsibility of "public or other nonprofit institution of higher
education" ISPs for actions of faculty members and graduate students).
42. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii), with the version of H.R. 2281 reported to the
House in late July 1998.
43. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), with H.R. 2180's proposed § 512(d).
44. See Sept. 1997 Hearings, supra note 32 (testimony of Ronald G. Dunn, President
Information Industry Assn.):
Copyright owners may suffer real harm if fraudulent complaints result in the
takedown of their works. The Association feels strongly that in such instances a
party whose material has been removed unjustifiably as a result of a complaint
that is not bonafide should be entitled to seek appropriate remedies against the
complainant for such removal.
45. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. tit. I, § 101(6) (1997) (including in the purposes of the bill
"to create incentives for the rapid elimination of infringing material residing on an electronic
communications systems or network without litigation.") (emphasis added); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (recognizing § 512 as "a
regulatory scheme in which courts are meant to play a secondary role to self-regulation" in
which "service providers [have] strong incentives to work with copyright holders.") (emphasis
in original).
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no potential liability to the subscriber, provided the ISP "takes
reasonable steps" to notify the subscriber and responds to counter
notifications.46
The statutorily set time line prioritizes the copyright holder over
the subscriber. On receipt of a notice, the ISP (to get the safe harbor)
must "expeditiously" take down the allegedly infringing content or
link. The ISP takes down the material before making any attempt to
contact the subscriber. After the take down the ISP "promptly," not
"expeditiously," must attempt to notify the subscriber. But if the
subscriber sends a counter notification, the ISP is not allowed to
repost for ten days. Instead, the ISP must advise the copyright holder.
If the copyright holder does not respond, the ISP must repost, but
retains its safe harbor. However, the ISP is required not to repost if
notified that the copyright holder has "filed an action seeking a court
order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity
relating to the material" involved.47
Notice the extraordinary lack of court protection available to the
subscriber before s/he is silenced. In a copyright suit, the copyright
holder has the burden of convincing a court to enjoin the alleged
infringer. Even though preliminary injunctions are relatively easy to
obtain in copyright suits, they still require an impartial federal judge
to consider both sides.48 In Section 512 NTP, all presumptions are
against the subscriber. His or her material is assumed illegal on the
bare say-so of the copyright holder. That core requirement of due
process, an independent decision maker, is curiously absent.49 The
copyright holder can block reposting merely by filing suit; no judicial
decision is needed. The statute does not even require the copyright
holder to request expedited court consideration.
Copyright holders have free license to target fair users. An
aggrieved copyright holder is not liable for improper take down
notices unless he "knowingly materially misrepresents" that the
"material or activity is infringing." The knowledge requirement is
subjective. The statute does not say "reasonably." Fair use is
notoriously difficult to decide objectively; courts are incredibly
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2005).
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2005).
48. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998) (arguing that routine issuing of
preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases is a First Amendment problem).
49. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 249 (1977) ("subjecting a defendant to trial
before a judge having 'a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant'.
effect[s] a denial of due process.") (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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unlikely to decide that a copyright holder subjectively knew that the
targeted posting was fair use. One wonders if automatic searching
robot mistakes would be considered "knowing" misrepresentations by
copyright holders. 50
Only four cases turn on the meaning of "knowingly materially
misrepresents."'5 1  Three find the notifier not liable; the other is
flawed. In the most authoritative interpretation, the MPAA saw
"download free movies" on Internet Movies.com operated by Michael
J. Rossi. The MPAA made no attempt to download any movies from
the site or to investigate the site's content, which was not infringing
and contained no movies. Instead, the MPAA dispatched take down
notices, which resulted in Rossi's losing his original ISP. Rossi sued
the MPAA alleging various state tort claims, including tortious
interference with contractual relations. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for MPAA on all claims. 52 Dissecting the
language and legislative history of 512, the court properly concluded
that the "good faith belief' in infringement required to support a take
down notice was purely subjective, especially in light of the phrase
"knowing misrepresentation. ' 53 It held that "[a] copyright owner
cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even
if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake. '54
Relying on Rossi's subjective standard, the District of Colorado
granted summary judgment that MGA Entertainment, Inc. had not
violated 512(f) by using eBay's Verified Owner's Program to cancel
an auction listing for a fleece hat with a Bratz® appliqu6.
An unreported case in the Southern District of New York granted
summary judgment to the RIAA when a targeted subscriber sued
under state tort theories and 512(f) for knowing material
misrepresentation in a take down notice. 55 RIAA sent a notice to
MP3Board's ISP alleging that MP3Board's site had "direct links to
50. The Ninth Circuit did not reach this issue because even though the site had been
located by the Ranger automatic search program, MPAA employees reviewed the site before
sending the take down notice. See Rossi v. MPAA, 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004).
51. In a fifth case, "[a]n allegation that a copyright owner created the infringing knock-
offs that it demanded be removed from the defendant's computer network [was held] sufficient"
to survive a motion to dismiss a 512(f) counterclaim. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. v. NCSofl Corp.,
No. 04-9253 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2005), according to 70 BNA PTCJ 834 (Sept. 16, 2005).
52. See Rossi v. MPAA, 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
53. See id. at 1003-06.
54. See id at 1005.
55 See Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012-13 (D. Col. 2005).
55. See Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2002).
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files on other Internet sites containing full-length sound recordings for
other users to download, including songs by [listed] artists" and
threatened the ISP with statutorily-unavailable money damages. The
court supported its ruling with several largely conclusory statements.
No evidence had been presented showing that any misrepresentation
had been made "knowingly," seemingly using a subjective standard.
While at least one of the links led to a copyright-holder licensed
download, others did not. The statute does not penalize the notice-
sender for misrepresenting the availability of monetary damages, or
for any other error, except for knowing, material misrepresentations
"that material or activity is infringing. 56
The only case penalizing a Section 512 notifier is an oddity, a
case where the copyright holder seemingly backed off, rather than
appeal an obviously erroneous decision, because of negative
publicity. 57 During the public controversy over the reliability of
Diebold's voting machines, an unknown person posted an archive of
internal Diebold emails online at several sites. Diebold responded
with take down notices to the ISPs where the archive was posted and
to ISPs hosting sites with hyperlinks to the posted archive. Some of
the targets sued Diebold for, among other claims, knowing material
misrepresentation in its take down notices. The parties cross-moved
for summary judgment. At this point, Diebold "represented to the
[c]ourt that it ha[d] withdrawn and in the future will not send a cease
and desist letter pursuant to the DMCA to any ISP concerning the
email archive."'58 Diebold admitted that some of the posting might be
fair use, never identified the exact content allegedly covered by
copyright which it believed was not fair use, and never filed a
copyright infringement suit.59 The court, relying on Black's Law
Dictionary, but not looking at the legislative history, interpreted
"knowingly" to include situations where "a party actually knew,
should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or
would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith,
that it was making misrepresentations. '60 Based on this extremely
56. Id. at *15.
57. Online Policy Gp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See also
Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau, I LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE
ARTS § 1:35 at 8 (commenting that "[wihile Judge Fogel may have reached the political result
that he desired.., his opinion shows a profound misunderstanding of copyright law.") (Aug.
2005 update, available from WESTLAW),
58. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
59. See id. at 1203-04.
60. Id. at 1204.
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broad definition of "knowingly," the court held as a matter of law that
Diebold "knowingly materially misrepresented [infringement] at least
with respect to the portions of the email archive clearly subject to the
fair use exception." 61  The court, therefore, piled on to its error
regarding the required state of mind, a legal error regarding mixes of
infringing and non-infringing material,62 and a factual error about the
clarity of fair use determinations. The decision obviously turned on
the court's distaste for Diebold's motive in using copyright law, the
desire to keep embarrassing material from being made public.63
However, copyright is not statutorily limited to the public-spirited. 64
Diebold, unfortunately, is a wrongly decided case that has not been
appealed for public relations reasons.
In sum, the statute was drafted on the presumption that all
targeted subscribers are infringing mice. Are they? Unfortunately,
the private nature of the Section 512 NTP system makes investigation
difficult. No court record exists unless a copyright holder responds to
counter-notification by filing suit. Even a search of all copyright
complaints filed would be unable to gauge how often this happens;
under federal pleading rules the copyright holder does not have to
mention the take down notice in the filed complaint. Since copyright
holders and ISPs are largely not government actors, freedom of
information requests are useless. The number of notices not received
by subscribers due to false contact information is extraordinarily
important; the comparison of that figure with the number of take
down notices sent would be a good indication of the number of
61. Id.
62.
[T]he district court finds in any event that a small, but more than negligible, body
of unpublished material cannot pass the fair use test, given the strong
presumption against fair use of unpublished work. Although we would
characterize the use here as more than 'small,' it makes no difference insofar as
entitlement to injunctive relief is concerned.
New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming
that non-authorized biography of Church of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard infringed
copyrights in Hubbard's unpublished papers), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
63. See Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 ("Diebold ... sought to use the DMCA's
safe harbor provisions . . as a sword to suppress publication of embarrassing content rather than
as a shield to protect its intellectual property.").
64. See, e.g., New Era Publications, 873 F.2d at 583 (rejecting district court's view that
outcome in copyright case should turn on importance of a critical biography of controversial
public figure); Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) ("the need to assess
the effect on the market for Salinger's letters is not lessened by the fact that their author has
disavowed any intention to publish them during his lifetime."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890, 899
(1987).
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rodents involved, that is of the number of evil, infection-spreading
mice inhabiting the Internet and nibbling on copyright-protected
postings.
I am grateful that Jennifer Urban has taken on the important and
difficult task of compiling empirical information on Section 512 NTP.
I consider her preliminary results to support the flawed nature of 512
NTP. 65
SECTION THREE. SOLUTION PART ONE: CODIFY DIGITAL FAIR USE
"The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors. '66 Digital rights
management technology,67 especially with the support of legal
liability for circumventing it even absent infringement, drastically
shifts the balance of copyright law in favor of the copyright holders. 68
Private NTP further chills those technologically capable of making
fair use of digitalized copyrighted materials. Loss of fair uses is not a
minor burden on the public amply justified by the need to protect
copyright holders' income streams. As a matter of constitutional
priorities, fair use is more important than such income streams.
Furthermore, the claims of economic harm have been vastly
overstated.
On the economic impact of P2P, the RIAA's own figures
demonstrate that most P2P uses are not substitutes for royalty-paying
transactions. Even assuming (counter-factually) that P2P is the only
reason CD album sales declined in the United States after 2000,69 the
65. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects "?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. (forthcoming May 2006).
66. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932), quoted in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,432 (1984).
67. Digital rights management technology allows content owners to determine and control
who and how users can view content such as media files on the Internet and elsewhere.
68. "[T]o the extent that the DMCA appears to legitimate technological controls over
copyrighted works, without regard to the effect on public policy, the statute effectively grants
rubber-stamp approval to such private legislation...." Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 51 (2001). See also,
e.g., Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48
VILLANOVA L. REv. 13 (2003); Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management In the United
States and Europe, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 323 (2004); Pamela Samuleson, Intellectual Property
and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
69. See OECD 2005 Rpt., supra note 12, at 8 (reporting that "[a]part from online piracy,
there have been other changes in the market environment for music over the past ten years such
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RIAA reported decline is 292 million albums per year, but P2P file
sharing involved 31.2 billion albums annually. 70  P2P barely
depresses industry revenue while vastly enhancing distribution. The
RIAA's response would probably be that illegal downloads replace
revenue-creating legal downloads. However, this response ignores
the late entry of authorized downloading into the market. Only P2P
motivated the music industry to listen to its customers. The music
industry has scant entitlement to profits from a market it tried to
suppress. 7 1
Furthermore, the entire discussion of economic effect assumes
that the present industry actors have some moral entitlement to all
revenue that can be squeezed from cultural property even if the
revenue is largely related to technology invented by others, and even
if the industry tried to stifle the technology. 72 My position is that
neither the recording industry nor the technology industry has a moral
entitlement to the entire economic surplus created by content/network
synergies. The public does. Since distribution is less expensive than
as the increased number of entertainment sources which may explain changing music sales.");
id. at 10 ("[li]t is very difficult to establish a basis to prove a causal relationship between the size
of the drop in music sales and the rise of file sharing."). See also COOPER, supra note 23, at 44-
46 (discussing inconsistent conclusions of various studies on relationship of P2P to music
industry income).
70. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors In Support of Respondent at 22-23, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 543 U.S. 1032 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v Grokster [hereinafter Lunney Brief] (this brief is the
brilliant work of Prof. J. Glynn Lunney, Tulane Univ. School of Law). See also Rafael Rob &
Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High Cs: Music Downloading and Social Welfare in a Sample of
College Students 3 (NBER Working Paper 10874, Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10874 (concluding that, in his sample, the reduction in deadweight
loss from downloading is almost twice the loss of industry revenue).
71. See, e.g., Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (the Grokster case led to a "surge in
negotiations, agreements, and launchings of new legitimate online music services or
technologies.") (remarks of Mary Beth Peters, at 3).
72. "The content industry has proven short-sighted, time and again, trying to stifle
technologies that ultimately proved beneficial not only to society but even to copyright owners.
They tried - and fortunately failed - to shut down juke boxes, radio, cable television, the VCR,
and the mp3 player." Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (testimony of Prof. Mark Lemely, at
1). Id. (testimony of Sam Yagan, founder of eDonkey, at 2) (reporting how his attempts to
legally license content where rebuffed by the content industry). "The music recording industry
is a highly-concentrated five firm oligopoly. Much of dominance achieved by large firms in the
industry results from control over the distribution and promotion of the products of the
industry." COOPER, supra note 23, at 47. Furthermore, the industry engaged and still engages
in anti-competitive and anti-consumer practices. P2P is one response to these industry practices.
See id. at 46-54. Immediately following the Grokster decision, "content providers and
distributors have been moving to announce in advance that they will 'license' only technologies
and techniques that are satisfactory to them .... " Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (remarks
of Gary Shapiro, at 10).
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before digitalization, the public should not be forced to pay for no-
longer-needed middlemen. Of course, the middlemen involved are
unhappy, but they deserve no more government support than harness
makers did when their jobs vanished as automobiles replaced horses.
In this, despite RIAA rhetoric, the elephants do not represent the
majority of creative artists.73 The vast majority of Americans who
download free music financially support the same artists in some
other way.74 The best adaptation to the digitally connected world
might be for music to be supported by live performances, leaving
distribution of non-live versions free to the public. 75  Other
reasonable suggestions include use of statutory licenses or levies on
technology for the benefit of copyright holders. 76 However, even
while the current system survives, copyright can and must be adapted
to be more equitable to the general public.
To make copyright morally acceptable, NTP must be modified
by clarifying to all what digital uses are legal fair uses and modifying
the NTP process to prevent chilling such uses. In suggesting the
proper contours of digital fair use, my two starting points are the
Constitution and general public opinion.
My constitutional base line is that Congress has power to enact
only such copyright statutes as promote the distribution of knowledge
and culture. I have supported this argument elsewhere and will not
73. Accord Pew Study, supra note 12, at 38 (concluding that majority of musicians do not
think that RIAA law suits serve musicians' interests). "Half of all artists say that copyright
regulations generally benefit purveyors of art work more than the original creators. Musicians
echo those views." Id. at v.
74. See id. at 43.
75. This suggestion corresponds to the Ancillary Products and Services Mode. See
BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SoC'Y, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CONTENT AND CONTROL:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POLICY CHOICES ON POTENTIAL ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS IN THE
MUSIC AND FILM INDUSTRIES 5 (2005),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/contentcontrol.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (listing
four basic models: digital media stores, P2P stores, Collective Blanket Licensing, and Ancillary
Products & Services)
76. See, e.g., Burk & Cohen, supra note 69 (arguing for changes in DRMs to allow fair
use, including coding changes and required use of escrowed key usable by external decision
makers); Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital
Copyright, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2004) (proposing complex virtual markets where
government distributes rewards decided on by users); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003)
(proposing comprehensive noncommercial use levy on a broad range of goods and services in
return for a broad right to use and manipulate cultural material for non-commercial purposes);
See Yu, supra note 14, at 698-744 (proposing eight different models including mass licensing,
compulsory licensing, voluntary collective licensing, and voluntary contribution).
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repeat myself here.77 Copyright's limit on First Amendment liberty is
constitutional only when modified by fair use allowances. 78 "[T]he
copyright laws are not intended to discourage or to control the
emergence of new technologies, including (perhaps especially) those
that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or more
effectively. '79 In short, the constitutional base line supports a strong
fair use right to use the most effective means yet developed for
distribution of cultural works, networked digital computers. This
base line is too vague, however, to provide definitive boundaries for
the required fair use right.
As to public opinion, I point to two main sources, the pro-private
use laws of other nations and a recent opinion poll.
Countries whose legislatures have not been captured by
copyright-industry special interest groups commonly recognize that
making a single, personal-use copy of a copyright-protected work is
not infringement--even if the user makes single copies of many such
works. 80 United States cases hold, or at least imply, that personal-use
copying is infringement, but this conclusion is still challengeable.
First, the courts only interpret statutes; Congress is free to change
them. Second, the Supreme Court has not reached the conclusion that
personal-use copying infringes. In MGM v. Grokster, "Grokster and
77. See Amicus Brief of Malla Pollack and Other Law Professors Supporting Grokster,
Ltd., et al. at 15-26, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 543 U.S. 1032 (2005)
(No. 04-480), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGMvGrokster; Malla Pollack, The
Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern First Amendment and the Original
Progress Clause (a.k.a. Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICs 23, 24-29 (2004)
(summarizing argument); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining
'Progress " in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, or Introducing the Progress
Clause, 80 NEBRASKA L. REv. 754 (2001) (presenting full argument).
78.
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to
make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people's speeches to the extent such assertions raise First
Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally
adequate to address them.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2001). These built in safe guards include the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use. See id. at 220.
79. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791 (2005)
(Breyer, J. concurring).
80. See Lunney Brief, supra note 71, at 6 n. 10 (collecting authorities). Often such rights
are premised on government levies on copying media and equipment. See Netanel, supra note
77, at 32-33. Accord Post-Grokster Hearing, supra note 9 (taking position on behalf of the
Consumer Electronics Association and the Home Recording Rights Coalition that creating a
personal library of tapes of television shows is fair use under United States law) (remarks of
Gary Shapiro, President, CEA, at 4).
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StreamCast concede[d] the infringement in most downloads." 81
Furthermore, due process problems undercut any implied judicial
conclusion that personal-use downloading is infringement. The
leading cases "holding" private digital use to be copyright
infringement were decided without participation by the alleged direct
infringers. 82  Professor Lunney argues that had the courts first
considered the fair use issue in cases where the private users were the
defendants, the courts would have reached the contrary conclusion.83
My second information source is the late 2004 report by the Pew
Internet and American Life Project on attitudes toward the Internet
and P2P, a study performed only after massive MPAA and RIAA
copyright litigation and "education" campaigns bashing P2P.84 The
study includes the following information on attitudes toward what
activities should be legal without permission (i.e. fair use):
81. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005).
82. See Lunney Brief, supra note 71, at 17-22.
83. See id at 22-26; see also Niels B. Schaumann, Direct Infringement on Peer-to-Peer
Networks 38 (William Mitchell College of Law, Working Paper No. 9, 2005) (arguing that
"copying by P2P users is not infringing, but that their distribution of copyrighted works ... does
infringe"), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-703882 (last visited June 25, 2005). But see
BMG v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that downloading music for personal
use is not "fair use").
84. See Pew Study, supra note 12.
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DATA FROM PEW STUDY
BURN MUSIC OR MOVIE CD FOR A FRIEND % legal % illegal
Musicians 47 41
Artists 46 48
General Public 43 50




General Public 33 50




General Public (not asked) - -




General Public 66 26
MAKING COPIES OF MUSIC/MOVIES/TV
PROGRAMS AND SELLING THEM TO OTHERS
Musicians 3 95
Artists 7 91
General Public 6 91
SENDING DIGITAL COPY OF MUSIC OVER THE
INTERNET TO SOMEONE YOU KNOW
Musicians 56 31
Artists 46 49
General Public (not asked) - -
This information supports a number of relevant conclusions.
First, the general public is more willing to respect intellectual
property than are musicians and artists. Second, none of these groups
translate disagreement with certain legal limitations into lawlessness;
no one condones selling copyrighted content without paying
royalties. 85 Third, the strongest disagreement with current positive
85. The thesis that disagreement with one law will lead to flouting law in general has been
assumed by many with scant, if any, empirical basis. Recent limited experiments have provided
some support, but did not involve testing whether disagreement with one element of copyright
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law is with the limitation on a music purchaser's use of that music on
other equipment the purchaser owns.
Oddly, the RIAA has also supported consumer format-switching.
The following except is from a written answer supplied to a
congressional committee by the RIAA in September of 2003:
[Question] 2: Do you have a problem with an Internet user
downloading a copyrighted song for their personal use? How much
freedom should music fans, whether they obtain their music in a
store or on line, have to make copies of songs or albums for their
own use?
[Response:] Once an individual has purchased a sound recording
(whether in a store or online), RIAA does not object to the
purchaser making a copy for his or her own personal use.
However, RIAA does object to the purchaser making unauthorized
copies for others, and such copying is illegal. Such copying results
in the distribution of a work from one consumer to another
potential consumer and thus also directly substitutes for sales by
copyright holders.
Downloading a copy of a recording for one's own personal use
from the Interet is no different in effect than shoplifting the
recording for one's own personal use from a brick-and-mortar
store. The online theft of the recording causes economic harm to
the Copyright holder by substituting for a legal sale that otherwise
would have occurred. 86
I would prefer Congress to enact a complete copyright exception
for personal, non-commercial use, including modification to Chapter
Twelve to allow anti-circumvention of controls preventing such use
and making available technology to allow this circumvention.
Unfortunately, I do not think congressional recognition of such public
entitlements is likely. Ruefully, I cannot claim that the public
currently recognizes how much the content industry has browbeaten it
into accepting unnecessary wealth-transfers. However, I do have a
more realistic suggestion.
The public strongly supports a fair use exception for making
copies of content purchased in one format for use in any other
format- including moving digital media between incompatible
equipment. Even the RIAA acceded to this at one time. Such a fair
legislation led to refusal to follow other aspects of copyright law. See Janice Nadler, Flouting
the Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1399 (2005).
86. Privacy Hearings, supra note 18, at 154 (response to supplemental questions for the
record submitted by Sen. Tom Carper for Mitch Bainwol, Chairman & CEO RIAA).
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use right should be an actual, not a hypothetical one. Chapter Twelve
of the copyright statute must be amended to end liability for
bypassing digital controls for such transfer, and for providing the
equipment or technology to bypass such controls. 87  The statute
should make clear that if such legal behavior results in later illegal
transfer or copying of files, the earlier behavior is not rendered illicit.
Just as content elephants refused to sell downloads until goaded by
P2P, I doubt that the involved pachyderms will agree to interoperable
digital rights management technologies without strong economic
pressure. 88
This compromise might be possible if the pot were sweetened
with a Section 512 subpoena process for 512(a) ISPs, i.e. process to
identify P2P users. The absence of such process merely reflects the
fact that P2P was not well known in 1998.89 The subpoena process
should simultaneously be modified to give individuals greater due
process protection for all types of 512(h) ISP subpoenas, but I leave
that argument to other articles.
SECTION FOUR. SOLUTION PART Two: MODIFY SECTION 512 TO
SUPPLY DUE PROCESS
Humans' due process rights were almost completely ignored
during the legislative history of Section 512. The only reported
discussion is in a Senate report:
The second concern raised about the applicability of section 512 to
public universities and libraries, and indeed other public entities
which operate as online service providers, is that by complying
with the notice and take-down provisions of section 512, the public
entities might violate the due process rights of their users. Any
87. I would prefer that all fair uses be exempted from Chapter 12 liability of any kind.
Cf H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998) (creating a fair use exemption from the anti-circumvention
provisions).
88. See lnteroperability Hearings, supra note 12, at 25 (remarks of Rep. Howard L.
Berman, R-Ca., stating that incompatible DRM technology prevents music purchased online
from Apple and Sony being played on the other's equipment). Accord Burk & Cohen,
supra note 69, at 54-55 (arguing that anti-circumvention "law should be designed to shift
technological development in a direction that balances the incentive structure of copyright
protection with copyright's concern for the public domain and for the legitimate fair use
privileges of the public.").; cf Thomas Crampton, France Weighs Forcing iPods to Play Other
Than iTunes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at C3, available at
http://nytimes.com/2006/03/17/technology/17ipod.html?_r-2.
89. See RIAA v.Verizon Interet Svcs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(recognizing that policy reasons for other 512 subpoena imply that Congress would have
allowed subpoenas to 512(a) ISPs if Congress had been "anticipated [P2P's] development," but
refusing to rewrite the statute to allow such subpoenas).
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such due process objection suffers at least two flaws. In the first
place, a prerequisite to any due process claim is a state law
property interest. In the case of the relatively new concept of
Internet access, the service provider contract, rather than any
common law property interest, would appear to be the yardstick of
the Internet user's property interest in continued access. The
contract for Internet service, therefore, can limit any property
interest that would form the basis for a procedural due process
claim. Second, and even more important, the procedural
protections afforded by the notification requirements of subsection
512(c)(3) and the provisions for the replacement of removed or
disabled materials in subsection 512(f) provide all the process that
is due. The Committee was acutely concerned that it provide all
end-users-whether contracting with private or public sector
online service providers-with appropriate procedural protections
to ensure that material is not disabled without proper justification.
The provisions in the bill balance the need for rapid response to
potential infringement with the end-users' legitimate interests in
not having material removed without recourse. 90
I take exception to almost every point made in this report, though
I admit that positive law has yet to enforce my view. First, the
interest at issue is a liberty right related to the First Amendment, not a
mere property interest which exists at the sufferance of the ISP
contract.9 1 Second, recognition of some common-carrier-like duties
on ISPs is overdue. ISPs are no longer fledgling entities requiring
super-tender congressional nurturing. The Internet has joined, and in
many cases supplanted, land-line telephones as the life line between
individuals - a life line that includes access to the communications
necessary to find and perform a job.92 Telephone firms have long
90. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 18 (1998) (accompanying S. 2037), available at
http://www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited June 15, 2005).
91. Accord Meachun v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) (recognizing both the
Constitution and state law as sources of liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause);
id. at 230 ("[N]either the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which
the Due Process Clause protects.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story
of Dred Scott v. Sandford, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 159 (Michael C. Doff ed.,
Foundation Press 2004) ("Liberty is different from property because the definition of liberty
flows from human nature and our ideals, not from historical accidents .. "). The majority in
Meachun agreed that some liberty interests flow from the Constitution itself, not state law. See
Meachun, 427 U.S. at 226.
92. Some consider broadband (as opposed to dial up) Internet access essential. See Steven
Levy, Will Sticks Lick Broadband Fix?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8938152/site/newsweek (last visited Aug. 16, 2005) ("High-
speed Internet is quickly becoming an essential, just like electricity and phone service.... If
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been held to due process standards when ending service, even when
law enforcement agencies allege illegal conduct.93 No ISP should be
allowed (let alone incentivized or required) to terminate a customer
without much more robust process than provided in Section 512.
Congress should enact stringent limits on an ISP's ability to
disconnect customers. Similarly, Congress should clarify that the
"repeat infringers," which ISPs are required to disconnect in order to
get Section 512 safe harbors, 94 are limited to those who have been
held repeat infringers by a court.95 Such banishment from the 'Net
should be for a limited period of time only. 96
Additionally, the current NTP process assumes that the
subscriber is a rodent and makes no provision for fair use. The
process needs to be modified to protect the First Amendment and
liberty interests of all online speakers. 97 I have several specific
suggestions.
First, when an ISP receives a take down notice, it should first
send a warning notice to the targeted subscriber. Before the content is
disabled, the subscriber should have a reasonable amount of time to
respond-for example, the ten days now allowed copyright holders to
respond to counter-notifications. Because mice do inhabit the 'Net,
"expeditious" take down should be allowed when specific indicia of
rodenthood are present. These should be spelled out in the statute. If
the email address or other contact information provided to the ISP by
someplace doesn't have broadband, people are less likely to move there and start businesses
there.").
93. See Sokol v. Pacific Utilities Comm., 53 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Cal. 1966) (holding that state
Public Svc. Comm. decision requiring telephone company to terminate without warning
subscriber's service on police notification of allegedly illegal activity violates due process).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2000):
The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service
provider only if the service provider- (A) has adopted and reasonably
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service
provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service
provider's system or network who are repeat [copyright] infringers.
95. Compare Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (W.D. Wa. 2004)
(holding that 512(i) does not require ISP to end service to everyone targeted by multiple take
down notices since notices do not take alleged infringers' defenses into account), with Perfect 10
v. CCBill, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (assuming that subscriber must be
disconnected whenever two or more notices are received by an ISP).
96. Accord Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for
Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2005)
(proposing limitation of five years for banishment of "repeat infringers" from the Internet).
97. See also Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy v. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 232 (2004-05)
(arguing that 512 violates subscribers' privacy entitlements).
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the subscriber is false, the subscriber is likely to be a rodent.
However, before take down, the ISP should have the duty to take
reasonable steps to check whether misdelivery is caused by something
innocuous, such as a typographical error. For example, the ISP
should be required to try the telephone number if the email link does
not work and to check available directories of email addresses.
Additionally, the subscriber is likely to be a rodent if an extremely
large number of music files or an entire newly released movie have
been posted in a manner encouraging massive copying by others.
Only in such circumstances should an ISP take down content
"expeditiously" without giving the subscriber a chance to respond.
Second, the notice to the subscriber should spell out the extent of
digital fair use and state clearly that if the subscriber responds to the
email with a claim of fair use, non-infringement for other reasons, or
mistake of identity, the accused posting will stay up unless a court
rules otherwise. The notice should also assure recipients that if the
copyright claim is inaccurate, the claimant will bear all out of pocket
costs involved in resisting take down.
Third, if the content is taken down before the subscriber
responds (because of indicia of rodenthood), it should be reposted
immediately upon receipt of counter notification. The original notifier
can then be promptly advised. The content should not be disabled
again absent a court order issued after standard court process.
Fourth, the copyright holder should have strict liability for
economic harm caused by any error of fact or law, including court
costs and attorney's fees. The copyright holder has chosen to bypass
the courts and should be penalized for erroneous self-help, as is
common in tort doctrine. 98 Fifth, any copyright holder who is found
liable for repeated acts of erroneous take down notification should be
barred from sending more take down notices. "Repeated" should
mean the same for this penalty as it does when considered sufficient
to cancel a "repeat" infringer's Internet access. Both should be
quantified in the statute. A copyright holder who sends take down
notices after being ruled a repeat over-notifier should be subject to
stiff penalties: the most appropriate might be the unenforceability of
the involved copyrights, but statutory or punitive damages would be
acceptable.
98. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 81, at 187 (West 2000) (stating that
person attempting to repossess a chattel is liable for mistake, even reasonable mistake, about his
greater right).
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Sixth, these details should be included in the policy ISPs must
post online for subscribers' information.
In short, absent strong indications of rodenthood, people should
not be treated like mice for the sole purpose of protecting copyright
holders' property claims. With these changes to protect people, I
support ISPs' immunity from copyright infringement by their
subscribers.
CONCLUSION
Section 512's privatization of copyright enforcement is not
appropriate. Free speech and humans' due process rights are more
important than copyright holders' potential monetary losses, except in
very limited instances where strong specific indicia of rodenthood are
present. Section 512 should be modified accordingly.
